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I.  Introduction
In their IPC Policy Research Brief #4, John Weeks and Terry McKinley
propose major departures from the prevailing neoliberal
macroeconomic framework that has dominated policymaking in
sub-Saharan Africa. The neoliberal model favours fiscal policy that is
preoccupied with maintaining small deficits, monetary policy
that is fixated on low inflation targets and exchange-rate policy that
is committed to full flexibility.
Weeks and McKinley describe an alternative framework with a more
expansionary fiscal policy to foster public investment and increase
domestic revenues; a managed exchange-rate regime to promote
export competitiveness and currency stability; and a monetary policy
that supports fiscal expansion and export promotion by achieving
low real rates of interest for private investment and the alleviation
of public-sector debts.
In this complementary Policy Research Brief, we expand on these themes by considering three interrelated issues in further depth:
1) inflation and monetary policy; 2) capital flows, speculation and the exchange rate; and 3) banking systems and access to credit.
We show that in each of these areas sub-Saharan African countries can pursue viable alternatives to neoliberalism.
For example, policymakers could take direct measures to dampen the very large inflationary pressures resulting from ‘supply shocks’—
e.g., sharp increases in food and energy prices—as opposed to holding back growth by raising interest rates and trying to contain
inflation at five percent or less. Governments could also pursue capital-management policies to reduce exchange-rate volatility.
And they could move aggressively to provide increased access to affordable credit, through offering loan guarantees for productive
activities and reviving public development banks.
II.  Inflation and Monetary Policy
Problems with a five-per cent inflation target.  The IMF and other global policy-setting institutions strongly support low inflation
targets, usually at about a five per cent threshold. Yet there is almost no evidence that holding inflation at such a low level necessarily
promotes economic growth (Pollin and Zhu 2006).
Figure 1 (next page) plots the relationship between inflation and economic growth for 25 low-income countries in the world,
including 17 from sub-Saharan Africa.  A visual inspection confirms what also emerges from a substantial amount of more formal
statistical analysis—namely, that there is no evidence that higher inflation, up to 20 per cent per year, correlates with lower economic
growth. Note that there is no pattern to the array of data points, even when outliers are eliminated.
Setting the inflation threshold at five per cent creates by itself a slow-growth bias since the primary methods recommended for
dampening inflationary pressures are to raise nominal interest rates and cut government spending. Of course, policymakers need to
be vigilant about controlling inflation. But they should address this problem by determining the sources of inflationary pressures and
whether economic growth and employment expansion could, indeed, benefit from a less restrictive macroeconomic environment.
Our research conducted on 28 sub-Saharan African countries for the period 1975-2005 has found that supply shocks, inertia and
exchange-rate depreciations—tied especially to volatile movements of the exchange rate—are the major causes of inflation in the
region (Heintz and Pollin 2008).
Supply shocks and inertia.  One important example of supply-shock inflation is a rapid rise in food prices due to droughts or other
breakdowns in a country’s system of food production and distribution.  Rapid increases in global oil prices can have similar inflationary
effects for the great majority of sub-Saharan African countries that are net oil importers.  A sharp rise in food or oil prices exerts
upward pressure on other important prices in the economy, such as transportation and electricity prices.
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Figure 1
Inflation and Economic Growth for Low-Income Countries,  1961-2000
Annual data are grouped into 5-year averages
Source: See Pollin and Zhu (2006).
Figure 2
Money Supply Growth in Kenya:
M1 as percentage of M3, 1997-2006
Note: M1 is currency outside banks and total demand deposits. M2
(not shown here) includes M1 plus ‘quasi monetary deposits’ and non-bank
financial institution deposits. M3 includes M2 plus foreign currency deposits.
Source: Central Bank of Kenya.
Such price increases tend to persist through an inertial
momentum, at least for another year or two. For example,
an increase in transportation prices can lead to demands by
workers for wage increases to cover their higher living costs.
And ensuing wage increases can produce further hikes in
transportation costs.
If a government wishes to dampen the effects of food-supply
shocks without resorting to significantly tighter monetary policy,
it could maintain a buffer stock of strategic grain surpluses that
could be released when needed.  To dampen the effects of oil
price shocks, governments could temporarily raise subsidies for
public transportation and electricity rather than allowing the
prices of these necessities to build inertial upward momentum.
Exchange-rate depreciations.  When a country’s currency
falls in value relative to that of its trading partners, its exports
will become cheaper on world markets but its imports will
become more expensive. Sub-Saharan African countries would
have to continue purchasing roughly the same level of imports
even when import prices rise because of their relatively inelastic
demand for such essential items as machinery, chemicals,
manufactured goods and oil. Since it is difficult for such countries
to produce domestic substitutes even after import prices rise, the
inflationary impact can be strong, particularly in the short run.
Hence, it is important to minimize rapid depreciations that can
generate such inflationary pressures.  We discuss below capital-
management policies to promote exchange-rate stability.
Over the longer term, countries would have the time to build
domestic industries capable of producing substitutes for a
rising share of their main imported products.
Monetary Policy Operations.  Throughout sub-Saharan Africa,
monetary policy focuses on maintaining control over the
growth rate of the money supply, narrowly defined mainly as
cash reserves in banks (so-called ‘M1’).  However, this is not
a reliable technique because the expansion of the supply of
money and credit  is strongly influenced by the demand for
credit by both domestic and foreign businesses.
Such demand significantly influences, in turn, the rate at which
a given supply of bank cash reserves will help expand general
economic activity.  Because the money supply responds to
such forces, the movements of its various measures (e.g., M1,
M2 and M3) are often unstable relative to one another.
We illustrate this instability of monetary aggregates in
Figure 2, which shows the relative stock of M1 and M3 for Kenya
between 1997 and 2006.  M1 rises from only 29 per cent of M3
in 1997 to 45 per cent in 2006.  This sharp rise in
the relative holdings of M1 means that the
Kenyan Central Bank cannot predict reliably
what the market demand for cash reserves—
i.e., M1 assets—will be at any given level of
economic activity.
Policymakers could be more effective by
targeting short-term interest rates as opposed
to the growth rate of the money supply. When
central banks set the rate at which they lend to
private banks, this lending rate will influence,
in turn, the short-term rates set by the private
sector. Such interest-rate targeting should
maintain rates as low as possible in order to
expand affordable credit throughout the
economy and minimize the servicing of the
domestic public debt. Setting the short-term
interest rate can also be used to promote a stable
and competitive exchange rate.
However, even targeting the short-term interest rate is too
narrow for conducting a successful monetary policy in sub-
Saharan Africa.  There are two interrelated reasons:  a) the
problem of excessive speculation and instability in financial
markets; and b) the problem of lack of access to credit,
especially for small enterprises.  We now cover, in turn, these
two major issues.
III.  Capital Flows, Speculation and the Exchange Rate
Exchange-rate management and monetary policy are often
seen as operating under a set of constraints. Specifically, it is
argued that only two of the following three conditions can
hold concurrently:  1) Free movement of capital into and out of
the economy; 2) A fixed exchange rate; and 3) An independent
monetary policy.
This problem is often referred to as the monetary policy
‘trilemma’. Its logic assumes that,  given unrestricted capital
mobility, a fixed exchange rate can be maintained only if
foreign exchange reserves are sufficient to defend the currency
against depreciation. So countries often must maintain high
interest rates in order to attract enough capital inflows to
maintain the fixed rate.
Under these conditions, monetary policy is subordinated to
exchange-rate targets—i.e., it is not independent. Similarly, if3
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monetary policy is free to set interest rates, the exchange rate
must be able to adjust accordingly to ensure a sustainable
external balance with the rest of the world.  Therefore, an
independent monetary policy is often assumed to require
a floating exchange rate.
The concept of the trilemma is often used to argue for a
relatively market-driven monetary policy and exchange-rate
regime. However, the  trilemma describes extreme ends of the
policy spectrum.
For example, exchange rates that are allowed to float in a
managed way (‘managed floats’) or are pegged loosely to the
dollar or other major currencies (‘crawling pegs’) are intermediate
policy initiatives.  Since such regimes are not committed to
maintaining a fixed rate, there is room for policy intervention
for fostering economic growth and employment expansion,
especially when governments pursue capital-management
initiatives (Epstein, Grabel, and Jomo 2003). For instance,
domestic currencies that are loosely pegged to the dollar can
have this link weakened when the costs—e.g., maintaining
large dollar reserves or otherwise—become too high.
The premise of such capital-management policies is that
unrestricted capital flows into and out of a country are not
optimal.  To date, relatively little attention has been devoted to
the use of such policies in sub-Saharan Africa, largely because
speculative capital flowing into and out of the region is still
relatively modest. However, as African equity and bond
markets become increasingly sophisticated, the problems
of volatile private capital flows and related exchange-rate
uncertainty will worsen.
South Africa provides a useful case study because it has long
operated with a well-developed financial sector, and has also
operated over long periods of time with innovative capital-
management policies (Pollin et al. 2007).
In 1979, South Africa established a dual-currency exchange-
rate system that was intended to break the direct link between
domestic and foreign interest rates, as well as to insulate the
country’s capital account from certain types of capital flows.
A market exchange rate was used for commercial transactions
while a separate, less favourable exchange rate, ‘the financial
rand,’ was used for capital transactions.
The dual-currency system, which remained in force until March
1995, was generally effective. A 2001 study by a researcher at
the South African Reserve Bank found that the volatility of the
rand was lower during the dual exchange-rate period than
during the periods of a unified exchange rate.  More recent
experiences with similar policies in Malaysia, Argentina
and other countries of East Asia and Latin America also
demonstrate the ways that capital-management policies
can be effectively implemented.
IV.  Banking Systems and the Access to Credit
Prominent features of the banking structure in sub-Saharan
African economies raise the cost of credit to prohibitive levels
and restrict access to credit markets altogether. These
problems are particularly serious for small businesses,
household enterprises and agricultural small-holders.
The interest-rate spread—i.e., the difference between lending
rates and deposit rates—tends to be high throughout the region.
The higher the spread, the higher the cost of credit for borrowers
for any given deposit rate. A high spread could also indicate that
deposit rates are unusually low, which would discourage savings
and limit the resources available to finance bank credit.
Figure 3 shows that the average interest rate spread in 2006
for 21 countries in sub-Saharan Africa was 8.9 per cent. The
comparable figure for 16 low- and middle-income countries in
Asia and Latin America was only 5.3 per cent, while that for the
United States was 2.9 per cent.
Figure 3
Average Interest Rate Spreads in 2006
Interest Spread = Prime Lending Rates - Deposit Rates
Note: The figure for sub-Saharan Africa is the median spread for 21
countries. That for Asia/Latin America is the median for 16 low- and middle-
income countries. The USA figure is the average difference between the
prime rate and the 1-month CD rate for 2006.
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics; Board of Governors of Federal
Reserve System.  See Heintz and Pollin (2008) for details.
Two factors are particularly important in explaining the
relatively large spreads in most sub-Saharan African countries
(Heintz and Pollin 2008).  The first is that, for the most part,
borrowers must pay high risk premiums in formal credit
markets.  This is due to perceptions, often incorrect, that
most creditors are high-risk borrowers.
Many commercial banking sectors have never developed the
capacity to collect information on the creditworthiness of
the potential borrowers who are outside of their traditional
clientele. Risk premiums are therefore likely to be particularly
high for small-scale and rural borrowers.
The second factor is that the banking system tends to be highly
concentrated, with a few large dominant banks. Under these
conditions, banks have a degree of market power to raise
lending rates and lower deposit rates.
The high cost of bank credit is only one aspect of the credit
problem. Often, private businesses have no access to credit,
even if they are willing to borrow at the prevailing market rate.
That is, credit is rationed. One reason is that banks in the
region frequently prefer to hold low-risk assets such as
government bonds.
Thus, we find that among 22 sub-Saharan African countries
in 2003, the median share of bank credit going to the private
sector was only 14.8 per cent of GDP.  The comparable figure
for nine low- and middle-income countries in Latin America
and Asia was 31.8 per cent—i.e., more than double the sub-
Saharan African level.
These limitations of formal financial systems in the region
have spurred innovation in informal financial institutions. The
informal sector generally operates with greater knowledge of
the operations of small businesses, household enterprises and
rural smallholders.  But since it is seldom integrated into the
formal banking system, it tends to have very limited funds.
Overall, financial systems in sub-Saharan Africa operate on the
basis of a serious disjuncture:  large commercial banks are
often unwilling to lend to small enterprises and especially toInternational Poverty Centre
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small- and medium-scale agriculture, while informal financial
institutions do not have the financial resources to provide
significant amounts of credit.
The goal should therefore be to develop effective linkages
between the two. For instance, relationships could be built
between formal banks and savings and credit associations
in order to facilitate group savings and lending for informal
and micro-enterprise development.  Such initiatives could
be tied to credit guarantees and other policies promoting
credit allocation.
Pollin, Githinji and Heintz (2008) outline such a programme in
Kenya, which has both a well-developed commercial banking
sector and the most extensive system of informal microfinance
institutions in sub-Saharan Africa.  They propose that the
government guarantee a significant portion—up to 75 per
cent—of loans that commercial banks make to microfinance
institutions.  This would lower the risks for the commercial
banks while infusing the microfinance institutions with enough
resources to make a significant difference in promoting small-
scale enterprises.
Moreover, to minimize incentives for businesses to defraud the
government through this system, the authors propose a system
of escrow accounts, to which  borrowers and lenders would both
contribute. Under this system, they would sacrifice their
contributions in the event of fraud or default.
A parallel measure for substantially increasing access to credit for
productive purposes in sub-Saharan Africa is to revive the region’s
public development banks (Pollin et al. 2007).  Such banks played a
crucial role in nurturing the successes of the East Asian ‘tiger’
economies, including Japan and the Republic of Korea.
The example of the Industrial Development Corporation in
South Africa, the largest such institution in South Africa, is
instructive.  Its 2005 Annual Report stated that through its
lending activity over 2004-05, it anticipated creating 16,700
jobs. But official unemployment in South Africa in 2005 was 4.3
million. Hence, the capitalization of the Industrial Development
Corporation needs to increase substantially and it should be
allowed to assume a higher level of risk to promote
employment expansion.
At the same time, effective performance standards and systems
of accountability would need to be developed, as was the case
with the successful East Asian development banks. These might
include public/private bank lending partnerships or a system of
escrow accounts that would create real costs to lenders who
were not maintaining their repayment commitments.
V.  Conclusion
In this Policy Research Brief, we describe several alternatives to
neoliberal economic policies for sub-Saharan Africa. We argue
that policymakers should pursue specific direct measures to
control inflationary pressures resulting from supply shocks
and inertia.  Monetary policy should then target the short-term
interest rate rather than the growth rate of the money supply.
Central banks should retain the capacity to concurrently
maintain reasonable control over the short-term interest rate
and the exchange rate through making judicious use of capital-
management policies, such as moderate exchange controls.
Finally, it is imperative for governments to dramatically increase
access to affordable credit for enterprises at all levels, including
small businesses, household enterprises and rural smallholders. The
key policy tools here are large-scale loan guarantee programmes
and the revival and recapitalization of public development banks.
The specific proposals that we describe here are well-known and
have demonstrated their effectiveness in a range of settings.
Taken together, these policies offer a coherent alternative to
neoliberalism—that is, they are basic tools for effectively attacking
the pervasive problems throughout sub-Saharan Africa of slow
long-term growth, mass underemployment and severe poverty.
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